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Abstract
Private companies’ collection of facial images is on the rise globally, which has major
implications for both economic development and privacy laws. This Comment uses the facial
recognition technology company Clearview AI and the video sharing app TikTok as case studies
to examine the problems raised by these practices. After summarizing the relevant legal regimes
created by the United Nations (U.N.) and the European Union (E.U.), it applies the E.U.
privacy regime to TikTok’s most recent Privacy Policy. The Comment concludes by proposing
updates to the E.U. and U.N. privacy regimes to more effectively regulate TikTok’s data
collection and analogous business practices. These proposed updates include treating all facial
images as special category biometric data under the E.U. regime and amending the U.N. regime
to specifically cover digital privacy.
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I. I NTRODU C TIO N
Facial recognition technology (FRT) facilitates the identification of
individuals from photos and videos based on their facial images.1 The technology
is increasingly prominent.2 For example, the North American facial recognition
market is expected to double by 2027.3 The Chinese facial recognition market is
also large and growing, connected to broad investment in artificial intelligence
(AI).4
Although both China and the United States (U.S.) are leaders in AI, their
markets reflect different investment patterns.5 In China, the government has
invested heavily in AI and FRT, boosting its surveillance capabilities.6 In the U.S.,
AI development is primarily driven by private sector commercial applications.7
The global growth of FRT and AI in both the private and public sectors has
spawned a host of privacy and data protection issues.8 Opponents are particularly
concerned about invasion of privacy and misidentification, which seems to occur
more often for non-male and non-white surveillance subjects.9
This Comment explores the implications of FRT and facial image collection
through two case studies: Clearview AI (Clearview) and TikTok. Clearview is a
pioneering FRT company.10 As discussed in Section III, the novel ways in which
its controversial software infringes on consumer privacy have spawned numerous
court cases and regulatory complaints. TikTok is a popular video sharing app
whose data collection practices include collection of users’ facial images.11
Clearview and TikTok are effective case studies because they have both achieved
success through cutting-edge data collection. Other companies will likely follow
suit, rendering these practices widespread. Additionally, because Clearview and
TikTok are both powerful players in their respective markets, resolution of the
legal issues they raise is important independent of implications for other
1

2

3

4

For more information on facial recognition systems, see Steve Symanovich, What is Facial
Recognition? How Facial Recognition Works, NORTON (Aug. 20, 2021), https://perma.cc/Y4FK-4MFF.
Antoaneta Roussi, Resisting the Rise of Facial Recognition, NATURE (Nov. 18, 2020),
https://perma.cc/D5HD-FT98.
In Charts: Facial Recognition Technology — and How Much Do We Trust It?, FIN. TIMES (May 16, 2021),
https://perma.cc/Z9JF-CWHZ [hereinafter In Charts: Facial Recognition Technology].
Id.

10

Id.
Id.
Id.
See Eric Lander & Alondra Nelson, Americans Need a Bill of Rights for an AI-Powered World, WIRED
(Oct. 8, 2021), https://perma.cc/M47B-GDX7.
In Charts: Facial Recognition Technology, supra note 3.
See Section I.A.

11

See Section I.B.

5
6
7
8

9
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companies. Issues associated with facial image collection and FRT reach beyond
traditional privacy law to implicate broader societal concerns such as the health of
democracies,12 political freedoms and human rights, and conceptions of consent
in the digital age. This means that data collection by companies like TikTok and
Clearview affects even people who do not use TikTok or are unconcerned about
abstract notions of privacy.
Recent decisions by the Hamburg Privacy Guarantor13 and other regulatory
authorities14 suggest that facial image collection is likely to be under-regulated
under E.U. privacy laws. Accordingly, this Comment will argue that it is important
to update the E.U. and U.N. privacy regimes to adequately address concerns raised
by facial image collection practices before they become more widespread.

A. Clearview and Photo Scraping Prac tices
Although recent FRT innovation in the U.S. has occurred primarily in the
private sector,15 law enforcement demand has driven development. Law
enforcement has historically relied on databases that use images from government
records, such as mug shots and driver’s license photos.16 Both the availability of
photos and technical details of photo searches have constrained the utility of these
databases. That left a space in the market for larger, more user-friendly databases.
Clearview, a U.S.-based facial recognition service that made waves when a
New York Times article highlighted its business practices,17 is distinct from other
FRT in three ways. First, Clearview “can automatically collect images of people’s
faces from across the internet, such as employment sites, news sites, educational
sites, and social networks including Facebook, YouTube, Twitter, Instagram and
even Venmo.”18 It collects these images despite sources’ policies prohibiting
“photo scraping.”19 Second, because Clearview does not require a head-on photo
to generate a match, it utilizes photos more effectively than many other

12

13
14
15
16

17
18
19

See generally Scott Skinner-Thompson, Agonistic Privacy and Equitable Democracy, 131 YALE L.J.F. 454
(2021) (arguing that legal privacy protections are key for the health of democracies because they
promote participation of marginalized groups).
See Section III.A.
See generally Section III.
Id.
Kashmir Hill, The Secretive Company That Might End Privacy as We Know It, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 18, 2021),
https://perma.cc/ETL3-J4YJ.
Id.
Id.
Id. See also Lori Kalani, et al., Web Scrapers and Their Targets Beware. Regulators Are Zeroing in on Privacy
Implications, LEXOLOGY (Nov. 17, 2021), https://perma.cc/A55E-YCKT.
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databases.20 Third, Clearview is a private company that can monitor searches
carried out in its software.21
Use of Clearview has taken off among law enforcement agencies, primarily
due to its large database and ease of use. Clearview’s CEO, Hoan Ton-That, said
in 2021 that 3,100 government and law enforcement agencies use the service.22 As
Clearview’s user base has grown, agencies have shared anecdotes about using the
software to solve crimes ranging from child exploitation to bank fraud.23
This explosion in use has amplified privacy concerns connected to
Clearview. Although “the accuracy of the tool is no longer a prime concern” after
recent federal testing, its legality is still uncertain.24 Additionally, privacy advocates
remain concerned about photo scraping and Clearview’s invasive nature.25 As
rapid growth has brought Clearview into the public eye, it has been the subject of
lawsuits and regulatory complaints around the world.26 The European Union
(E.U.)’s responses to Clearview are discussed in Section III.

B. TikTok’s June 2021 Privacy Policy
TikTok is a popular social media app. In 2020, it was the most downloaded
app in the world.27 TikTok is widely used around the world, but its parent
company, ByteDance, is based in China.28 Together with general privacy concerns,
TikTok’s ties to China have led to heightened suspicion of its business practices
in countries whose governments have fraught relationships with the Chinese

20
21
22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Hill, supra note 16.
Id.
Will Knight, Clearview AI Has New Tools to Identify You in Photos, WIRED (Oct. 4, 2021),
https://perma.cc/M8ME-RZSB.
Memorandum from Paul D. Clement on Legal Implications of Clearview Technology to Clearview
AI 7 (Aug. 14, 2019), https://perma.cc/B5H7-7P5B (memorandum provided to potential
customers by Clearview AI).
Kashmir Hill, Clearview AI Does Well in Another Round of Facial Recognition Accuracy Tests., N.Y. TIMES
(Nov. 23, 2021), https://perma.cc/K2PD-NC4N.
Id. See also Kashmir Hill, Clearview AI Finally Takes Part in a Federal Accuracy Test., N.Y. TIMES (Oct.
28, 2021), https://perma.cc/L9BH-ZVWG.
See, e.g., Byron Kaye, Australia Says U.S. Facial Recognition Software Firm Clearview Breached Privacy Law,
REUTERS (Nov. 3, 2021), https://perma.cc/NC9B-BXE9; Canada's Laws Need Updating to Protect
Against Abuse from Surveillance Tech, Watchdog Says, CBC RADIO (Oct. 8, 2021),
https://perma.cc/A9EV-Z95S.
Rei Nakafuji, TikTok Overtakes Facebook as World's Most Downloaded App, NIKKEI ASIA (Aug. 9, 2021),
https://perma.cc/QYU8-HRB9.
Megan McCluskey, TikTok Has Started Collecting Your ‘Faceprints’ and ‘Voiceprints.’ Here’s What It Could
Do with Them, TIME (June 14, 2021), https://time.com/6071773/tiktok-faceprints-voiceprintsprivacy/.
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government. The Trump administration’s moves to ban TikTok in the U.S.
illustrate this.29
TikTok enables users to upload short videos and view other users’ content.30
Because the platform is based on video sharing, TikTok necessarily has access to
users’ facial images. Its newest privacy policy, last released in June 2021 and
updated in October 2021, authorizes the app to collect “biometric identifiers and
biometric information,” such as users’ “faceprints and voiceprints.”31 The policy
empowers the company to collect “information about the images and audio that
are a part of your User Content,” including “identifying the objects and scenery
that appear, the existence and location within an image of face and body features
and attributes, the nature of the audio, and the text of the words spoken in your
User Content.”32 Privacy advocates have sounded the alarm based on the idea that
“faceprints” and “voiceprints” are inherently personally identifiable information.33
Previous legal challenges related to TikTok’s privacy practices are covered in
Section IV. The new privacy policy has not yet faced serious legal challenges.

C. Roadmap
This Comment proceeds as follows. Section II summarizes two pertinent
privacy and data protection regimes: those of the U.N. and E.U. Section III
summarizes the legal treatment of Clearview’s business practices to date. Section
IV summarizes legal treatment of TikTok’s data collection practices to date.
Section V applies the E.U. legal regime discussed in Section II to TikTok’s Privacy
Policy and uses recent regulatory decisions regarding Clearview to analyze
TikTok’s data collection practices. Section VI argues that the E.U. and U.N.
privacy regimes should be updated to more effectively regulate TikTok, Clearview,
and other companies engaging in similar practices. The Comment concludes by
briefly discussing the implications of Section VI.

29

30

31

32

33

Charlie Campbell, How TikTok Found Itself in the Middle of a U.S.-China Tech War, TIME (Aug. 6, 2020),
https://time.com/5876610/tiktok-china-tech-war/.
For more information on how TikTok works, see Heather Schwedel, A Guide to TikTok for Anyone
Who Isn’t a Teen, SLATE (Sept. 4, 2018), https://perma.cc/CWK2-63QF.
Sarah Perez, TikTok Just Gave Itself Permission to Collect Biometric Data on US Users, Including ‘Faceprints
and Voiceprints,’ TECH CRUNCH (June 3, 2021), https://perma.cc/2KEY-HTV4.
Privacy Policy, TIKTOK, https://www.tiktok.com/legal/privacy-policy-eea?lang=en (last visited Apr.
11, 2022). Although TikTok has separate privacy policies for users in the U.S. and users in the
European Economic Area (EEA), the same language appears in both privacy policies. Both policies
are available on TikTok’s website, at the link provided. The link defaults to the EEA policy.
McCluskey, supra note 28.
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II. I NTE RNATION AL P RIVAC Y R E GIME S
There is no global online privacy regime on point here. This Section,
therefore, begins by discussing the U.N. privacy regime, which is global but does
not clearly cover TikTok and Clearview. It then moves to the E.U. regime, which
is not global but covers TikTok and Clearview.

A. The U.N.
The U.N. privacy regime is based on the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights (UDHR)34 and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(ICCPR).35 Because they are part of the U.N. privacy regime, they have a broader
reach than do E.U. regulations. However, unlike the E.U.’s General Data
Protection Regulation (GDPR), they are not specific to the modern privacy
challenges stemming from cybersecurity and digital technologies. They also lack
enforcement mechanisms.

1. UDHR
UDHR, which was published in 1948, articulates high-level formulations of
fundamental rights.36 UDHR does not contemplate the rise of the internet, which
fundamentally reshaped the privacy landscape. It has not been updated since its
drafting. UDHR Article 12 guarantees the right to privacy. It provides that “[n]o
one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy, family, home or
correspondence, nor to attacks upon his honour and reputation. Everyone has the
right to the protection of the law against such interference or attacks.”37 Because
UDHR Article 12 is much briefer than the relevant provisions of GDPR, it is
more difficult to clearly demonstrate its applicability to modern practices like
photo scraping. Additionally, UDHR does not create legally binding obligations
for signatory states.38

34
35

36
37
38

G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Dec. 10, 1948) [hereinafter UDHR].
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter
ICCPR].
UDHR, supra note 34.
Id. art. 12.
See What is the Universal Declaration of Human Rights?, AUSTL. HUM. RTS. COMM’N,
https://humanrights.gov.au/our-work/what-universal-declaration-human-rights (last visited Apr.
11, 2022) (“The Universal Declaration is not a treaty, so it does not directly create legal obligations
for countries . . . Some argue that . . . it has become binding as a part of customary international
law.”).
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2. ICCPR
ICCPR, which was drafted in 1966, is similarly brief.39 ICCPR Article 17
reads identically to UDHR Article 12.40 Therefore, it is equally difficult to
demonstrate its applicability to modern data collection practices.

3. The Special Rapporteur on the Right to Privacy
In 2015, the U.N. Human Rights Council adopted a resolution appointing
the Special Rapporteur on the Right to Privacy for a three-year term.41 That term
was subsequently renewed for another three years.42 The Human Rights Council
reaffirmed the right to privacy protected in UDHR Article 12 and ICCPR Article
17 in its 2015 resolution appointing the Special Rapporteur.43 That resolution
explicitly stated that “the same rights that people have offline must also be
protected online, including the right to privacy.”44
The Special Rapporteur does not produce legislation. Instead, its primary
role is to “gather relevant information, including on international and national
frameworks, national practices and experience, to study trends . . . in relation to
the right to privacy.”45 It provides guidance for U.N. organs and legislating bodies.
Its reports include components assessing protection of privacy rights by judicial
authorities.46

4. Issues under the U.N. privacy regime
Clearview and TikTok’s data collection practices raise two potential issues
under UDHR and ICCPR. First, does casting a wide net for data collection
constitute “arbitrary . . . interference with . . . privacy?”47 The answer could
change based on interpretations of “arbitrary,” “interference,” or “privacy.”
Sweeping collection of facial images may belong under this category. Previous

39
40
41

ICCPR, supra note 35.
Id. art. 17.
Human Rights Council Res. 28/16, U.N. Doc. A/28/16, at 3 (Mar. 26, 2015) [hereinafter Human
Rights Council Res. 28/16].

42

Human Rights Council Res. 37/2, U.N. Doc. A/37/2 (Mar. 22, 2018).

43

Human Rights Council Res. 28/16, supra note 41, at 3.
Id.
Id.
See, e.g., Report of the Special Rapporteur on the right to privacy, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/40/63, at 7
(Oct. 16, 2019) (“The Special Rapporteur supports the strict application of the tests of
proportionality and necessity in a democratic society as an important benchmark with global
repercussions.”).

44
45
46

47

ICCPR, supra note 35, art. 17.
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interpretations of ICCPR Article 17 have not squarely addressed this.48 However,
the Special Rapporteur has recommended minimizing data collection, “clear and
detailed controls” in privacy laws, and a risk management approach,49 which cut
against sweeping facial image collection.
Second, what does “protection of the law” mean?50 A law like GDPR might
suffice, depending on its interpretation and application. However, a less strict
solution might also suffice. Alternatively, if GDPR is interpreted in extremely
permissive ways, more stringent regulations might be necessary.

B. The E.U.
1. General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR)51
GDPR, the main E.U. law on this topic, entered into force in 2016.52
According to its official website, GDPR is “the toughest privacy and security law
in the world.”53 It reaches beyond the borders of the E.U. because “it imposes
obligations onto organizations anywhere, so long as they target or collect data
related to people in the EU.”54 TikTok and Clearview are both regulated under
GDPR because they process Europeans’ data. The primary enforcement
mechanism is fines.55 “There are two tiers of penalties, which max out at €20
million or 4% of global revenue (whichever is higher), plus data subjects have the
right to seek compensation for damages.”56
GDPR compliance requirements differ for different types of data. This
Comment discusses “biometric data” and “personal data.” Under GDPR Article
4, “biometric data” is “personal data resulting from specific technical processing
relating to the physical, physiological or behavioural characteristics of a natural
person, which allow or confirm the unique identification of that natural person,

55

See, e.g., Human Rights Council General Comment No. 16, U.N. Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.9, ¶ 10
(Apr. 8, 1988) (discussing the requirement for data collection to be regulated by law but not
specifically commenting on sweeping data collection).
See Report of the Special Rapporteur on the right to privacy, Joseph A. Cannataci, U.N. Doc.
A/76/220, at 22–23 (Jul. 23, 2021) (discussing data privacy in the context of pandemic response).
ICCPR, supra note 35, art. 17.
Regulation 2016/679, of The European Parliament and of The Council of 27 April 2016 on the
Protection of Natural Persons with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free
Movement of Such Data, and Repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection
Regulation), 2016 O.J. (L 119) [hereinafter GDPR].
Ben Wolford, What is GDPR, the EU’s New Data Protection Law?, GDPR.EU,
https://perma.cc/F67K-5SQW.
Id.
Id.
See id.

56

Id.

48

49

50
51

52

53
54
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such as facial images or dactyloscopic data [fingerprints].”57 “Personal data,” on
the other hand, might cover “a name, an identification number, location data, an
online identifier” or “one or more factors specific to the physical, physiological,
genetic, mental, economic, cultural or social identity of that natural person.” 58 In
short, biometric data is a type of personal data that uniquely facilitates
identification of individuals.
Personal data processing is regulated by GDPR Article 5.59 Data processing
must fall within a legal basis for collection of personal data under GDPR Article
6(1).60 Additionally, data must be processed according to high-level principles:
lawfulness, fairness, and transparency; purpose limitation; data minimization;
accuracy; storage limitation; integrity and confidentiality; and accountability.61
Lawfully processing special category biometric data requires satisfying both
the Article 6 legal basis requirement and the conditions imposed by Article 9.
Under Article 9, processing of “biometric data for the purpose of uniquely
identifying a natural person,” along with other “special categories of personal
data,” is prohibited except for prescribed exceptions.62 The most pertinent
exceptions for this Comment are when “the data subject has given explicit consent
to the processing of those personal data for one or more specified purposes,”
“processing is necessary to protect the vital interests of the data subject,”
“processing relates to personal data which are manifestly made public by the data
subject,” or “processing is necessary for reasons of substantial public interest.” 63
In short, although all personal data is protected under GDPR, Article 9
restricts data processing more than Article 5 does. This distinction is especially
important because many data processors and controllers64 fail to comply with
GDPR requirements65 and regulators cannot possibly monitor or bring
57

58
59
60

61

GDPR, supra note 51, art. 4(14). “Dactyloscopy” is “the science of fingerprint identification.”
Dactyloscopy, ENCYC. BRITANNICA, https://perma.cc/F27P-V6SB.
Id. art. 4(1).
See id. art. 5.
See id. art. 6(1). See also Edward S. Dove & Jiahong Chen, What Does It Mean for a Data Subject to Make
Their Personal Data ‘Manifestly Public’? An Analysis of GDPR Article 9(2)(e), 11 INT’L DATA PRIVACY
LAW 107, 107–08 (2021).
GDPR, supra note 51, art. 5.

62

Id. art. 9(1). Article 9(1) also prohibits processing of other “special categories of personal data” that
are not discussed in this Comment.

63

Id. art. 9(2). These terms are not defined in the text of GDPR and guidance on their interpretation
is discussed in Sections V and VI.
See GDPR, supra note 51, arts. 4(7)–(8) (“‘[C]ontroller’ means the natural or legal person, public
authority, agency or other body which, alone or jointly with others, determines the purposes and
means of the processing of personal data.” and “‘[P]rocessor’ means a natural or legal person, public
authority, agency or other body which processes personal data on behalf of the controller.”).

64

65

See Tamjid Al Rahat, et al., Automated Detection of GDPR Disclosure Requirements in Privacy Policies Using
Deep Active Learning, ARXIV (preprint) (Nov. 8, 2021).
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enforcement actions against every noncompliant company. In a context of
imperfect enforcement, relative restrictiveness and specificity of regulatory
requirements are critical for protecting sensitive data.
GDPR Articles 13 and 14 are also important for assessing the legal status of
Clearview and TikTok’s data collection practices in the E.U. Article 14 stipulates
that, in cases “[w]here personal data have not been obtained from the data
subject,” data controllers and processors must provide data subjects with “the
purposes of the processing for which the personal data are intended as well as the
legal basis for the processing.”66 Article 13 imposes the same requirement “[w]here
personal data relating to a data subject are collected from the data subject.”67
Finally, GDPR Article 22 has important implications for Clearview and
TikTok. Article 22(1) provides that “[t]he data subject shall have the right not to
be subject to a decision based solely on automated processing, including profiling,
which produces legal effects concerning him or her or similarly significantly
affects him or her.”68 Because Clearview does not get data subjects’ explicit
permission, its practices would not qualify for the consent-based exception to the
prohibition on automated processing laid out in Article 22(2).69 Even if Clearview
is not collecting special category biometric data, its practices could run afoul of
the Article 22 prohibition on automated processing. This provision may also pose
problems for TikTok.

2. The European Commission’s Proposed AI Regulations70
The European Commission “is the EU’s politically independent executive
arm” and is responsible for proposing new E.U. legislation.71 In April 2021, it
released Proposed AI Regulations.72 The regulations, which outlined “a risk-based
framework for applications of artificial intelligence, included only a partial
prohibition on law enforcement’s use of biometric surveillance in public places—
with wide ranging exemptions that have drawn plenty of criticism.”73
While the Proposed AI Regulations are not binding, they may serve as a basis
for future binding legislation. In the meantime, they reflect E.U. attitudes towards
66
67
68
69
70

71
72

73

GDPR, supra note 51, art. 14(1).
Id. art. 13(1).
Id. art. 22(1).
See id.
Proposal For a Regulation of The European Parliament and of The Council Laying Down Harmonised Rules On
Artificial Intelligence (Artificial Intelligence Act) And Amending Certain Union Legislative Acts, COM (2021)
206 final (Apr. 21, 2021).
European Commission, E.U. (last visited Nov. 19, 2021), https://perma.cc/TK3A-3U7M.
See Mark MacCarthy & Kenneth Propp, Machines Learn that Brussels Writes the Rules: The EU’s New
AI Regulation, BROOKINGS INST.: TECHTANK (May 4, 2021), https://perma.cc/CCW3-3HGX.
Natasha Lomas, UK’s ICO Warns Over ‘Big Data’ Surveillance Threat of Live Facial Recognition in Public,
TECHCRUNCH (June 18, 2021), https://perma.cc/7VR9-TQRK.
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FRT and may provide clues about regulatory authorities’ application of GDPR to
Clearview, TikTok, and other companies collecting facial images. The law
enforcement exception is particularly significant because it opens the door to
many potentially under-regulated uses of FRT.

3. The Council of Europe’s Guidelines on Facial Recognition74
The Council of Europe is an international human rights organization that
promotes democracy, human rights, and the rule of law in Europe.75 Unlike the
similarly named European Council, it is not an E.U. institution.76 In 2021, the
Council of Europe released new guidelines on facial recognition.77 These
guidelines provide high-level guidance for parties making decisions regarding
FRT.78 The guidance for legislators advises that, for each use, the legal framework
should provide: “a detailed explanation of the specific use and the intended
purpose; the minimum reliability and accuracy of the algorithm used; the retention
duration of the photos used; the possibility of auditing these criteria; the
traceability of the process; [and] the safeguards.”79 Based on GDPR, the guidance
also says FRT use must have a legal basis, and must be assessed based on factors
including proportionality and “the impact on the rights of the data subjects.”80
Another noteworthy provision is that “[c]onsent should not, as a rule, be the
legal ground used for facial recognition performed by public authorities in view
of the imbalance of powers between the data subjects and these authorities.” 81
This guidance also encompasses “private entities authorised to carry out tasks
similar to those of public authorities.”82
Finally, the guidance focuses on facial image processing that enhances
identifiability of data subjects, not mere possession of facial images.83 It is
particularly focused on “biometric data templates,” defined as “digital
representation[s] of the unique features that have been extracted from a biometric
sample and [are] stored in a biometric database.”84
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COUNCIL OF EUR., GUIDELINES ON FACIAL RECOGNITION (2021) [hereinafter GUIDELINES
FACIAL RECOGNITION].
See Do Not Get Confused, COUNCIL OF EUR., https://perma.cc/ZMH7-9VK2.
See id.
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See GUIDELINES ON FACIAL RECOGNITION, supra note 74.
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See id. at 3.
Id. at 7.
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See id.
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4. Key issues under the E.U. privacy regime
Although individual regulators have ruled on Clearview’s practices under
GDPR, they have not issued general opinions, and Clearview has not been banned
from the E.U. altogether. There have been no regulatory decisions regarding
TikTok’s latest privacy policy. Future treatment of Clearview and TikTok will
likely turn on four questions.
First, are the facial images at issue biometric data or personal data for
purposes of GDPR? There is an ongoing debate about whether all pictures of
individuals are “biometric data.”85 Because both TikTok and Clearview collect
facial images, the classification of images has implications for both entities’ GDPR
compliance requirements.
Second, how will Clearview’s data be used? Decisions based on photo
scraping-supported FRT may present additional GDPR compliance challenges.
Decisions “based solely on automated processing, [including profiling], which
produces legal effects concerning [the data subject] or similarly significantly affects
him or her”86 may violate GDPR independent of concerns about consent and data
classification.
Third, could Clearview satisfy any of the GDPR Article 9 exceptions?
Clearview markets itself as a service for law enforcement, not private parties.87
Superior FRT used exclusively by governmental authorities for critically important
public goals like terrorism prevention could theoretically satisfy the “substantial
public interest”88 exception for Article 9.89 Similarly, Clearview could argue that it
qualifies for the Article 9 exemption based on the scraped photos being
“manifestly made public by the data subject”90 because they are pulled from social
media and other public-facing websites. Although TikTok is not marketing itself
as geared toward law enforcement, it might similarly attempt to fit its practices
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Catherine Stupp, Clearview AI Raises Disquiet at Privacy Regulators, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 4, 2021),
https://perma.cc/3MES-CHFR (citing authorities weighing in on whether a facial image is
inherently biometric data).
GDPR, supra note 51, pmbl. (71).
See CLEARVIEW AI, https://perma.cc/5JEN-2EJK.
GDPR, supra note 51, art 9(2)(g).
See Louis-Philippe Gratton, Expert Commentary, GDPR TEXT: ARTICLE 9 GDPR PROCESSING OF
SPECIAL CATEGORIES OF PERSONAL DATA, https://perma.cc/XXF5-FHQG:
The terms ‘substantial public interest’ are not defined in the General Data
Protection Regulation. As the exception refers to the Union or Member State
law, article 9 2) (g) gives a margin of appreciation to the national jurisdictions . . .
A substantial public interest may be related to the exercise of fundamental rights
and freedoms, like organizing the electoral process, or the maintenance of order
and security, like fighting terrorism.”
Id. art. 9(2)(e).
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under the “manifestly made public” exception to Article 9 if the images it collects
are Article 9 special category data. This is discussed in Section V.
Fourth, to what degree can TikTok and Clearview be said to provide notice
to data subjects, as required under GDPR Articles 13 and 14? Because data
subjects must agree to TikTok’s terms of use to use the app, this is primarily a
question about adequacy of disclosures. As discussed in Section III, lack of data
subject consent has already posed problems for Clearview.

III. L E GAL T RE ATME NT OF C LE ARVIE W AND O THE R F AC IAL
R E C OGNITION S OF TWARE IN THE E.U. TO D ATE
A. The Hamburg Privacy Guarantor (HPG) Complaint
German citizen Matthias Marx filed a complaint with the HPG, a state-level
data protection authority in Germany, seeking deletion of his personal data
collected by Clearview.91 Because the data was collected without Marx’s consent,
HPG ordered Clearview to delete the data.92 However, HPG’s order only required
deletion of the hash values associated with images of Marx.93 The order did not
require Clearview to delete the captured images, which Marx had also requested.94
A hash value pseudonymizes sensitive data. From a technical perspective,
“[a] digest or hash function is a process which transforms any random dataset in
a fixed length character series, regardless of the size of input data.”95 The output
of a hash function is a hash value.96 Hash values allow data grouping because the
same unique input always generates the same unique output.97 “[A]pplying a hash
function to a direct identifier should prevent the re-identification of this direct
identifier.”98 However, features of the input and the hash function may increase
the chances of re-identification.99
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DER HAMBURGISCHE BEAUFTRAGTE FÜR DATENSCHUTZ UND INFORMATIONSFREIHEIT (HAMBURG
COMM’R FOR DATA PROT. AND FREEDOM OF INFO.), CONSULTATION PRIOR TO AN ORDER
PURSUANT TO ARTICLE 58(2)(G) GDPR 1 (2021) [hereinafter HAMBURG DPA DECISION].
See id. at 4.
See Clearview AI Deemed Illegal in the EU, But Only Partial Deletion Ordered, NOYB (Jan. 28, 2021),
https://perma.cc/77NJ-9WKB.
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See id.
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AGENCIA ESPAÑOLA DE PROTECCIÓN DE DATOS & THE EUR. DATA PROT. SUPERVISOR,
INTRODUCTION TO THE HASH FUNCTION AS A PERSONAL DATA PSEUDONYMISATION TECHNIQUE
5 (2019) [hereinafter INTRODUCTION TO THE HASH FUNCTION].
See id. “Hash” is sometimes used to refer to both the hash function and the hash value output. This
Comment will use the terms “hash function” and “hash value” to avoid confusion.
See id. at 7.
Id. at 10.
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In plain English, a hash function is like a code. Because the same hash value
always refers to the same input, a hash value is like an extremely complex
codename. Whether a computer without access to the original hash function can
“break the code” to figure out the data subject’s identity depends on the nature of
the hash function. A well-written hash function should be extremely difficult to
“break.”
In its decision, HPG classified the hash value associated with Marx as special
category biometric data.100 It reached this conclusion because Clearview “uses a
specially developed mathematical procedure to generate a unique hash value of
the data subject which enables identification.”101 Under this decision, Marx’s data
was governed by GDPR Article 9. HPG specifically stated that Clearview failed
to qualify for any of the exceptions provided in GDPR Article 9(2), reiterating
that Marx never consented to processing of his data.102
HPG’s decision is particularly interesting for three reasons. First, the
decision ordered the deletion of Marx’s hash value but not his photos. The
distinction is not necessarily meaningful for Clearview. However, it leaves images
collected and stored without associated hash values in a legal gray area. Are they
Article 9 special category data? Second, HPG wrote that Clearview failed to qualify
for any of the Article 9(2) exceptions. However, it did not preclude the possibility
that other FRT might fulfill Article 9(2) in the future. Third, HPG issued a narrow
order applying specifically to Marx’s complaint.103 “Any European Data
Protection Authority (DPA) has the right to issue general orders that go beyond
the individual complaint.”104 Absent a general order, data subjects must submit
individual complaints to have their data deleted.105 This is significant because an
individual complaint requirement will likely lead to fewer individuals’ data being
deleted. Data subjects must know they need to file a complaint, understand the
relevant administrative procedures, and feel strongly enough to complete the
submission process.

B. The Privacy International Complaints
Privacy International, noyb – European Center for Digital Rights, the
Hermes Centre for Transparency and Digital Human Rights, and Homo Digitalis
filed complaints against Clearview with multiple E.U. regulators on May 27,

104

See HAMBURG DPA DECISION, supra note 91, at 3.
Id.
See id.
See NOYB, supra note 93.
Id.

105

See id.

100
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2021.106 The complaints attacked Clearview’s handling of both “regular” personal
data and “biometric data.”107 They specifically alleged that Clearview failed to
obtain the necessary data subject consent and lacks a “lawful basis for collecting
and processing” any of its data.108 Regulators were required to respond within
three months of filing.109 Since the filing of these complaints, data protection
authorities in Greece, France, and the United Kingdom have started official
investigations into the company’s practices.110

C. The Commission Nationale de L’informatique et des
Libertés (CNIL) Decision
CNIL, the French Data Protection Authority, ordered Clearview to cease
collecting data of individuals located within French territory on December 16,
2021.111 It also ordered Clearview to delete the data within two months of the
decision.112 The decision, which was a response to the Privacy International
complaints and the other complaints, found that Clearview violated Articles 6, 12,
15, and 17 of GDPR.113 CNIL specifically found that Clearview lacked a legal basis
for collecting and processing biometric data under Article 6.114 Failure to comply
with the CNIL order within two months could result in sanctions and/or fines.115
At the time of this writing, there have been no updates about Clearview’s
compliance with the CNIL decision.

D. The United Kingdom Information Commissioner’s Office
(UKICO) Opinion
UKICO, the U.K.’s national authority regulating data privacy, published an
opinion condemning the use of Live Facial Recognition Technology (LFRT) in

106

107
108
109

See Challenge Against Clearview AI in Europe, PRIV. INT’L (May 27, 2021), https://perma.cc/NK4TF2JA [hereinafter Challenge Against Clearview].
Id.
Id.
See Robert Hart, Clearview AI — The Facial Recognition Company Embraced by U.S. Law Enforcement —
Just Got Hit with A Barrage of Privacy Complaints in Europe, FORBES (May 27, 2021, 08:22am)
https://perma.cc/W892-BXK3.
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See Privacy International (@privacyint), TWITTER (Sept. 23, 2021, 7:12AM),
https://perma.cc/LRS6-P8LW.
See Facial Recognition: the CNIL Orders CLEARVIEW AI to Stop Reusing Photographs Available on the
Internet, CNIL (Dec. 16, 2021), https://perma.cc/8ZHZ-UUPJ [hereinafter CNIL Opinion].
See id.
See id.
See id.
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June 2021.116 One source of law that it applied was U.K. GDPR.117 Although
neither Clearview nor TikTok utilize LFRT, UKICO’s analysis has implications
for both companies.
First, the opinion refers to biometric data being extracted from facial images,
rather than facial images themselves constituting biometric data.118 “Facial images
become biometric data when ‘specific technical processing’ is carried out ‘which
allow or confirm the unique identification’ of an individual. The individual does
not have to be identified for this data to become biometric data—it is the type of
processing that matters.”119 This conception mirrors HPG’s categorization of the
hash value associated with Marx as biometric data.
Second, the opinion notes that “[b]iometric data constitutes special category
data whenever it is processed ‘for the purpose of uniquely identifying a natural
person[.]’ . . . As such, biometric data will be special category data in the majority
of cases.”120 Special category data must be processed according to the more
stringent requirements of Article 9, rather than the more permissive requirements
governing processing of other personal data.121
Third, the UKICO opinion highlights concerns that LFRT is unlikely to
obtain adequate data subject consent for automated processing.122 This fits with
both the HPG decision and the regulatory complaints filed by Privacy
International et al.123 Because adequate consent under GDPR requires disclosure
of the intended purposes of the data collection,124 this affects both Clearview and
TikTok.
Fourth, the opinion highlights bias and discrimination concerns.125 Although
the UKICO opinion does not discuss Clearview, one of privacy advocates’ main
concerns about Clearview is its lack of proven accuracy, especially when coupled

116
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See Natasha Lomas, UK’s ICO Warns over ‘Big Data’ Surveillance Threat of Live Facial Recognition in Public,
TECHCRUNCH (Jun. 18, 2021), https://perma.cc/7VR9-TQRK.
See Information Commissioner’s Opinion: The Use of Live Facial Recognition Technology in Public Places, INFO.
COMM’R’S
OFF.
(Jun.
18,
2021),
https://ico.org.uk/media/fororganisations/documents/2619985/ico-opinion-the-use-of-lfr-in-public-places-20210618.pdf (last
visited Nov. 12, 2021) [hereinafter UKICO Opinion].
See id. at 5.
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Id. at 26.
Id.
See id.
See id. at 31.
See HAMBURG DPA DECISION, supra note 91, at 3 (discussing consent of the data subject); Challenge
Against Clearview, supra note 106 (alleging lack of data subject consent).
See supra Section II.B (discussing GDPR Articles 13 and 14).
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with broader concerns about FRT bias.126 These concerns speak to the broad
principles governing GDPR and may shape its application.

E. Other Statements by E .U. Regulatory Authorities
Other E.U. authorities have issued decisions that are relevant but not directly
on point for this Comment. For example, the Office of the Deputy Data
Protection Ombudsman (DDPO) of Finland, part of the Finnish national data
protection regulator, reprimanded the Finnish National Bureau of Investigation
(NBI) for its use of Clearview AI.127 “[I]n late 2019 and early 2020 . . . four
individuals at the NBI carried out a total of 120 searches on the system over the
period of one month.”128 DDPO ordered the NBI to notify individuals whose
identities were known that their images were used in the Clearview searches. 129
“Police were also directed to request Clearview to delete the information that it
uploaded to the company’s servers.”130
The Swedish Data Protection Authority (SDPA), Sweden’s national data
protection regulator, likewise fined a school for GDPR violations for using FRT
to take attendance.131 Although the school obtained parents’ consent to run a pilot
program, the consent was inadequate because of the power imbalance between
the students and the school board.132 SDPA also concluded that the program was
an unjustifiable invasion of privacy because there are less intrusive ways to take
attendance.133 Although the program at issue was not Clearview, this analysis
about the characteristics of legally adequate consent for FRT applies to
Clearview’s practices. The focus on a less restrictive alternative is also pertinent.
Similarly, in 2020, the French Administrative Court of Marseille invalidated
the use of FRT to control access of students and visitors to a high school. 134 The
court based its decision on legally inadequate consent and proportionality, with
the FRT regime failing the proportionality inquiry because there was a less
restrictive alternative available.135 Notably, the opinion did not comment on the
126
127

128
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130
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133
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See Hill, supra note 16.
See Data Protection Ombudsman Raps Finnish Police over Controversial Facial ID App, YLE –FINNISH
BROAD. CO. (Sept. 29, 2021), https://perma.cc/NVH7-K836.
Id.
See id.
Id.
See Facial Recognition in School Renders Sweden’s First GDPR Fine, EUR. DATA PROT. BD. (Aug. 22, 2019),
https://perma.cc/R9KJ-MKY6 [hereinafter Sweden’s First GDPR Fine].
See id.
See id.
See Julie Schwartz, Facial Recognition Challenged by French Administrative Court, HOGAN LOVELLS (May
29, 2020), https://perma.cc/55ML-8QGZ.
See id.
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particularities of processing minors’ biometric data under GDPR.136 The decision
also highlights the importance of clearly establishing an appropriate legal basis for
data processing.137 While security, public health, and other concerns that
governmental authorities might address using Clearview are stronger legal bases
than school attendance,138 the legal basis for data processing remains important.
For TikTok, which is not pursuing key governmental objectives, the threshold
question of legal basis may be a major hurdle.
Finally, the European Parliament recently called for a ban on police use of
FRT in public places, predictive policing, and private facial recognition databases
like Clearview.139 Although the resolution is non-binding, it is a strong indicator
of current attitudes toward Clearview and commercial FRT.140

IV. T RE ATME NT OF T IK T O K ’ S D ATA P RAC TICE S TO D ATE
A. The Dutch Data Protection Authority ( DDPA) Complaint
In July 2021, DDPA fined TikTok €750,000.141 The DDPA fine was based
on violations of GDPR Article 12, rather than failure to safeguard biometric
data.142 Specifically, “during the period from 25 May 2018 to 29 July 2020
inclusive, TikTok Inc. infringed Article 12(1) of the GDPR by failing to inform
children in an intelligible language about the processing of personal data.”143
The DDPA opinion indicates that European regulators may subject TikTok
to heightened scrutiny as the app becomes increasingly popular. However, it does
not shed light on regulators’ attitudes toward TikTok’s broader data collection
practices. First, it focuses on practices affecting children, who receive special
protection under GDPR.144 Second, it focuses on the notice function of providing
a privacy policy in Dutch, rather than the content of the policy.145 Third, it
136
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See id. (discussing a previous Deliberation by CNIL and noting that “[w]here there are no strong
security reasons or societal issues legitimating the processing, the identification of the legal basis for
the implementation of facial recognition is therefore a crucial point that requires a high level of
attention”).
See Melissa Heikkilä, European Parliament Calls for a Ban on Facial Recognition, POLITICO (Oct. 6, 2021),
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See id. at 1.
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See GDPR, supra note 51, art. 8 (specifying conditions for processing of children’s data).
See Dutch DPA Decision, supra note 141, at 1 (providing a Privacy Policy to Dutch users only in
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considers TikTok’s practices prior to the introduction of its new privacy policy,
which authorizes more extensive data collection. The data referenced in the
decision,146 which is classified as personal data under GDPR Article 4,147 does not
include “faceprints” or “voiceprints.”

B. The Irish Data Protection Commission’s (IDPC) Probe
In September 2021, the IDPC, Ireland’s national DPA, opened two probes
into TikTok’s business practices.148 The first probe will examine TikTok’s
handling of children’s data, including age verification measures.149 The second will
investigate whether TikTok’s transfer of personal data to China violates E.U.
law.150 IDPC has not provided an expected end date for either probe. If the probes
find violations of GDPR, IDPC “is allowed to impose fines of up to 4% of global
revenue.”151
The IDPC probes exemplify a larger controversy. Other data regulators have
historically been unhappy with the long investigations conducted by IDPC, which
regulates many foreign companies whose E.U. headquarters are in Ireland.152 This
tension has led at least one regulator to say that GDPR’s decentralized
enforcement mechanisms may be ripe for reform.153

V. A P P LIC ATION OF GDPR TO T IK T O K ’ S P RIVAC Y P OLIC Y
This Section considers four applications of GDPR to TikTok: defining
biometric data, assessing TikTok’s legal bases for data collection, evaluating the
Article 9(2) exemptions under which TikTok might fit its activities if the images
are classified as biometric data, and examining whether TikTok’s data collection
satisfies the proportionality requirement.
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A. Are the “Faceprints” and “Voiceprints” that TikTok Is
Collecting Special Category Biometric Data under GDPR?
Classification of the “faceprint” and “voiceprint” data will depend on how
TikTok stores and analyzes it. This is because classification of special category
biometric data under Article 9 turns on data processing. Article 4, describing the
characteristics of the data itself, defines biometric data as “allow[ing] or
confirm[ing] the unique identification of [a] natural person.”154 To fall within
Article 9, such biometric data must be processed “for the purpose of uniquely
identifying a natural person.”155
The first question is whether TikTok stores the images and recordings with
associated hash values. Although it declined to issue a pan-European order, HPG
interpreted unique hash values as biometric data in its decision regarding
Clearview’s database.156 HPG’s decision, which is likely to be persuasive to other
data protection authorities (DPAs), focused on the fact that this type of hash value
is unique and “enables identification.”157 The same concerns would apply to any
hash values used by TikTok because a hash value associated with a specific user is
by definition unique.158 Therefore, if TikTok’s software stores the collected
“faceprints” and “voiceprints” using associated hash values, those hash values
would almost certainly be classified as biometric data. Because such hash values
are specifically created to render users identifiable, the hash values themselves
ought to fall squarely within Article 9.
The second question is whether TikTok stores the facial images and voice
recordings in other ways that are easily searchable. These might include manually
created tags such as “white” or “male.” Manual tags would not necessarily be
hashed because each individual tag does not contain sensitive information that
needs to be protected. The inquiry is the same as the inquiry that led HPG to
consider hash values biometric data. The more clearly the tags identify a specific
person, the more clearly they fit within the language of GDPR Article 9. The
number and specificity of the labels matter because an increase in either one is
likely to increase the odds of identifying a given individual.159 By way of
illustration, if an image is labeled with 300 tags, it may be feasible to identify the
data subject by running a sufficiently narrow search. Such identification would be
possible even though no single tag or small number of tags would contain enough
information to identify the subject of the photo. The dearth of regulatory
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decisions makes it difficult to pinpoint a specific standard for whether non-hash
value labels incorporated into data processing would be considered Article 9
special category biometric data.
The third question is whether the facial images and voice recordings
themselves would be considered special category biometric data, regardless of
how they are stored. This is murkier than the inquiries regarding hash values and
other storage parameters. The HPG order, which only required deletion of the
hash value associated with Marx’s photos,160 suggests that facial images themselves
are not necessarily special category biometric data in the eyes of DPAs. TikTok
would likely advance this logic by arguing that, from a technical perspective, the
images and recordings are not readily identifiable without further processing. This
would probably be compelling because, unlike Clearview, TikTok’s business
model is not premised on identifying the subjects of photos. However, the
vagueness of the purposes laid out in the Privacy Policy complicates third parties’
ability to draw conclusions about the precise nature of TikTok’s business model. 161

B. What Is the Legal Basis for TikTok’s Data Collection?
Regardless of whether the facial images and voice recordings it collects are
special category biometric data under GDPR Article 9, TikTok must satisfy one
of the legal bases enumerated in Article 6.162 TikTok’s privacy policy cites several
legal bases for its collection and use of information. These are “contractual
necessity, legitimate interests (ours, yours or those of another party), consent,
compliance with a legal obligation, performing a task in the public interest, and
protection of vital interests.”163 However, the privacy policy does not specifically
state which basis TikTok is relying on to collect facial images and voice recordings.
TikTok might be using data subject consent as its legal basis for collection
of facial images and voice recordings, given that users must accept TikTok’s terms
of use and privacy policy as a prerequisite to using the platform. However, this
superficially plausible characterization of users’ consent could be challenging to
substantiate because E.U. regulatory authorities have closely scrutinized consent
in recent cases involving facial images.164 The Swedish school decision,165 in
particular, suggests general skepticism towards consent as a basis for processing
sensitive data. Instead of taking nominal consent at face value, regulators seem to
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See HAMBURG DPA DECISION, supra note 91, at 4.
See Section I.B.
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be looking to the factors affecting the making of the agreement. This may be a
problem for TikTok because anybody who wants to use the platform is forced to
agree to the terms of use and privacy policy, rather than meaningfully opting in.
However, TikTok may be able to successfully argue consent as a legal basis
for collecting facial images and voice recordings. Unlike the school in the Swedish
DPA case, TikTok is a private entity. That mitigates concerns about coercion
because, unlike a school or other public service, consumers are free to not use
TikTok if they dislike its practices. Although “EU data protection law does not
generally make a substantial distinction between personal data in a private space
and in a public one,”166 the ability to meaningfully opt out of private services like
TikTok means that user consent is more robust than consent to data processing
by monopolistic public services. Additionally, it is not clear that TikTok is
collecting special category biometric data under GDPR Article 9. This contrasts
with the Swedish school case because FRT clearly falls under Article 9. On
balance, it seems likely that adequately informed consent would allow TikTok to
carry out its data collection in compliance with recent interpretations of GDPR.
Even if TikTok was unable to successfully argue consent as a legal basis for
collecting facial images and audio recordings, it could still use one of the other
legal bases highlighted on its web page.167 For example, providing enjoyable,
interactive content is a legitimate interest of the company. So is content
moderation. TikTok could justify data collection by demonstrating connections
between the specific data collected and these interests.

C. Evaluating the GDPR Article 9(2) Permissions
The default under GDPR Article 9 is that collection and processing of
special category data are not permitted. If regulators regard the facial images and
audio recordings collected by TikTok as special category biometric data, the
collection must fall within one or more of the enumerated Article 9(2) exceptions
to be lawful. TikTok’s activities are most likely to fit under either Article 9(2)(a)
or Article 9(2)(e). Article 9(2)(a) allows processing where “the data subject has
given explicit consent.”168 Article 9(2)(e) allows processing of the data where
“processing relates to personal data which are manifestly made public by the data
subject.”169
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1. Contrasting GDPR Articles 9(2)(a) and 9(2)(e)
Regulatory interpretation of the 9(2)(a) “explicit consent” exception is
somewhat more developed than regulatory interpretation of the 9(2)(e)
“manifestly made public by the data subject” exception.170 The two exceptions
differ in three important ways.
First, they have different downstream effects. The consent-based
justification allows the data subject to withdraw their consent at any time, which
allows restriction of downstream uses of their data.171 In contrast, “if the data
subject is deemed to have manifestly made their data public, they will not be able
to restrict downstream uses of such data as one would by withdrawing their
consent.”172 It is an open question whether removing the data from all public
platforms would allow the data subject to curtail future use.173
Second, the exceptions differ in their interactions with the right to erasure.
A data subject has the ability to pursue the right to erasure after withdrawing
consent for the processing of their data.174 It is more difficult for a data subject to
access the right to erasure under the 9(2)(e) “manifestly made public”
justification.175 This is because such requests must pass a balancing test to be
granted.176 Additionally, data subjects may only make such requests under 9(2)(e)
when the Article 6 bases are either public interest177 or legitimate interests.178
Third, national governments have differing abilities to restrict the two
justifications. Under 9(2)(a), national governments can prevent prohibitions on
processing from being lifted based on explicit consent.179 There is no comparable
provision for 9(2)(e).180 Article 9(4), which allows additional legislative restrictions
on processing of biometric data, may or may not allow states to prohibit
processing of “manifestly made public” data altogether. 181
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Dove & Chen, supra note 60, at 117 (explaining that 9(2)(e) “was perhaps one of the least discussed
provisions in the course of legislating the GDPR.”). See also id. at 108 (“There is little guidance from
national data protection authorities (DPAs) or the European Data Protection Board (EDPB) on
Article 9(2)(e); nor does there seem to be much precedent for its invocation.”).
See id. at 112.
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See id. at 112–13.
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In summary, data controllers like TikTok may prefer to rely on the
“manifestly made public” exception because it imposes a lower ongoing regulatory
burden than the “explicit consent” exception. However, there is not yet a clear
standard for determining when data has been “manifestly made public by the data
subject.”182 The guidance issued to date is discussed below.

2. Defining “manifestly made public by the data subject”
Neither GDPR Article 9 nor the relevant recitals define “manifestly made
public by the data subject.” Therefore, defining the exception requires a two-step
inquiry. First, what does it mean for the data to be “manifestly made public?”
Second, what constitutes publicization “by the data subject?” Based on regulators’
answers to these two questions, it is possible to piece together an idea of how this
exception has been, and will be, interpreted.
One source of information is UKICO.183 UKICO has interpreted
“manifestly made public” as requiring a condition of accessibility by anyone. 184
According to UKICO’s guidance, “[t]he question is not whether [the information]
is theoretically in the public domain . . . The question is whether any
hypothetical[ly] interested member of the public could access this information.”185
UKICO has also written about how to consider the requirement that the
information be publicized “by the data subject.” According to its guidance,
reliance on this justification requires confidence that the data subject’s disclosure
of the information “was unmistakably a deliberate act on their part.” 186 The
UKICO guidance includes a specific mention of social media posts, noting that:
You might also find it hard to show that someone has manifestly made
information public if, for example, they made a social media post for family
and friends but default audience settings made this public. You should
therefore be very cautious about using this condition to justify your use of
special category data obtained from social media posts. 187
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Id. at 108.
The guidance discussed in this Section was written prior to Brexit. It should remain informative
after Brexit, particularly because UK GDPR will remain part of UK law. See Overview – Data Protection
and the EU, INFO. COMM’R’S OFF. (UK), https://ico.org.uk/for-organisations/dp-at-the-end-ofthe-transition-period/overview-data-protection-and-the-eu/ (last visited Mar. 20, 2022) (“The
General Data Protection Regulation has been kept in UK law as the UK GDPR.”).
Dove & Chen, supra note 60, at 117.
What Are the conditions for Processing?, INFO. COMM’R’S OFF. (UK), https://ico.org.uk/fororganisations/guide-to-data-protection/guide-to-the-general-data-protection-regulationgdpr/special-category-data/what-are-the-conditions-for-processing/#conditions5 (last visited
Nov. 7, 2021).
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Overall, UKICO’s guidance focuses on the key criteria of awareness and
voluntariness.188 As Dove and Chen note in their discussion of the UKICO
guidance, “the data subject’s misunderstanding of who would have actual access
to their data may render the disclosure involuntary, and as a result, the processing
invalid altogether.”189 Other legal scholars have reached the same conclusion,
arguing that this standard “requires an affirmative act by the data subject.”190 This
aligns with The Handbook on European Data Protection Law, which says that the
permission “must be construed strictly and as requiring the data subject to
deliberately make his or her personal data public.”191
Scholars and authorities issuing guidance have converged on a narrow
reading of the “manifestly made public” exception. “In practice, however, courts
seem to have embraced broader interpretations than those of DPAs and legal
commentators, thereby casting a wider scope.”192 According to the High Court of
Justice for England and Wales, “the disclosure does not have to be an action
directly triggering the dissemination of the sensitive data.”193 Although this
opinion and others like it suggest that courts diverge from the scholarly consensus,
the degree of divergence remains unclear.
Reconciling the narrow scholarly consensus and broader court decisions,
Dove and Chen have proposed a legal test for GDPR Article 9(2)(e) that
incorporates both data subjects’ intent and their reasonable expectations.194 Their
test is neither a “standard of implied intention” nor an absolute standard of
consent.195 Instead, it occupies a middle ground through a three-step inquiry. First,
it asks whether there is a close or attenuated connection between the data
processing at issue and data allegedly manifestly made public by the data subject.196
Steps two and three then consider whether the data was “manifestly made public”
and whether it was publicized “by the data subject,” respectively.197
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See Dove & Chen, supra note 60, at 117 (“[T]he ICO has emphasized the importance of the
awareness and voluntariness by the data subject.”).
Id. at 117.
Id. at 118 (quoting and discussing the work of Ludmila Georgieva and Christopher Kuner).
EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS, EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS,
& EUROPEAN DATA PROTECTION SUPERVISOR, HANDBOOK ON EUROPEAN DATA PROTECTION
LAW 162 (2018).
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Step one has a “relatively low threshold” and “would be met where a
controller wished to process any special category of personal data concerning an
individual, and that personal data emanates from the data subject themself.”198 As
such, step one is unlikely to be a barrier for a data processor or controller wishing
to pass the Dove and Chen test. Steps two and three are more difficult hurdles to
overcome.
Step two begins by evaluating the data subject’s intention. Did they mean to
publicize the data? “What is required is objective evidence (eg [sic] a record of
signature) of the explicit subjective intention (e.g. a statement of making the
uploaded file accessible by anyone)” of the data subject.199 For the “public”
portion of the test, Dove and Chen adopt UKICO’s stance, writing that “‘public’
must mean available to everyone.”200 They apply a pragmatic perspective, noting
that “if a disproportionate, resource-intensive amount of effort is needed to access
the data, it is less likely to be considered ‘public.’”201
In step three, Dove and Chen consider whether the data was publicized by
the data subject or another actor. For this portion of the test, they adopt a “literal
interpretation of the phrase” by looking at whether the public nature of the data
is a direct result of the data subject’s actions.202 In the case of data publicized via
social media companies and other third-party intermediaries, “there would need
to be a clear indication made by the data subject that they were relying upon the
intermediary to make their data public.”203
Dove and Chen’s test fits with the limited guidance from regulatory
authorities interpreting the “manifestly made public” exception under GDPR
Article 9(2)(e). Because it also reconciles this guidance with scholarly consensus
on the issue, the test has both predictive and normative value. Therefore, even
though courts and regulatory authorities might interpret the provision differently
if consumers bring complaints against TikTok, the test provides a useful
framework for this Comment. Accordingly, Section V.C.3 applies the test to
TikTok’s new data collection practices, based on the possibility that the
“faceprints” and “voiceprints” will be considered Article 9 special category
biometric data.
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3. Is the data collected by TikTok “manifestly made public by the data
subject” under the Dove and Chen test?
This Section will apply the Dove and Chen test to TikTok’s data collection
practices. First, it will consider the connection between the data and its processing.
Second, it will consider the “manifestly made public” prong. Finally, it will
consider the “by the data subject” prong of the test. In summary, “faceprints” and
“voiceprints” from certain kinds of TikTok accounts most likely fit under 9(2)(e).
For other TikTok accounts, the answer is debatable.
TikTok’s collection of “faceprints” and “voiceprints” most likely passes the
first prong regarding the connection between the data and its processing.
Assuming the information is only used for content moderation and technical
features like filters, the link is direct. If TikTok processes the data to use it in other,
less technical ways, the answer to this question becomes considerably more
complex. Because TikTok’s privacy policy is written to cover all of TikTok’s data
collection and discusses a wide range of uses for that data, it is not entirely clear
how TikTok is using facial images and audio recordings.
The outcome of the second prong of the test depends on whether a TikTok
user’s profile is public or private. Public TikTok profiles are accessible to any
TikTok user.204 Private profiles are only accessible to approved followers.205
Although any user may switch their account from a public account to a private
account, the default setting is a public account.206 The public/private setting
provides the “objective evidence” required by the test.207 The inquiry does not end
there, however. We must consider three distinct groups of users: 1) public profile
users regularly interacting with members of the public, 2) public profile users not
regularly interacting with members of the public, and 3) private profile users.
Public profile users who are frequently interacting with new users, making
efforts to gather new followers, and taking similar steps are clearly and consistently
demonstrating their knowledge that their profiles are publicly accessible. We can
thus infer that, by uploading content to a platform whose purpose is to publicize
videos with the knowledge that their specific profiles are public, they intended to
publicize their content. Because TikTok videos necessarily include facial images
and audio recordings, “faceprints,” “voiceprints,” and other data extracted from
those videos become fair game for data processing.
The behavior of public profile users not regularly interacting with members
of the public does not provide the same support for the application of 9(2)(e). If
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See Controlling What People See on Your Profile, TIKTOK (May 8, 2019), https://perma.cc/D8SNZBGP.
See id.
See id.
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users are only interacting with their known followers, they might not realize that
their profiles are public due to TikTok’s default settings. Although TikTok might
argue constructive consent, based on the idea that users should have known their
profile’s settings and read the terms of use, constructive consent does not fulfill
the standard of voluntary and informed consent. It would also be in tension with
the specific reference to social media default settings in the UKICO guidance,
which casts doubt on the idea that posts made public by default settings should
be used as evidence of the posts being manifestly made public.208 Therefore, these
users’ “faceprints” and “voiceprints” should not be considered “manifestly made
public” under 9(2)(e). In practice, these users may be difficult to distinguish from
users with public profiles who regularly interact with the general public. How
much interaction with people who are not one’s known followers is enough to
put a TikTok user “on notice” that their profile is public? How much interaction
is enough to allow regulators and data processors and controllers to reasonably
infer the data subject’s intentions? This would be much clearer if the default
profile setting was private.
The final group of users to consider is those with private profiles. These
individuals should not satisfy the “manifestly made public” inquiry for two
reasons. First, they have taken the affirmative step of switching their profiles from
public to private. This suggests that they deliberately avoided making their
information publicly accessible. Although TikTok could argue constructive
consent based on its privacy policy, as discussed above, this is not a realistic
conception of how consumers make decisions.209 Second, the information from
private profiles is not accessible to the public. Neither the fact that TikTok has
access to the information from the back end nor the fact that a technologically
savvy person might find a way around privacy settings changes this determination.
Those are not average members of the public and finding ways around profiles’
privacy settings is clearly a “disproportionate, resource-intensive amount of
effort.”210
This three-part categorization is somewhat complicated by the idea of
making public posts private after the fact. Users who undertake after-the-fact
privatization could fall within any of the three groups described above. There is a
colorable argument that after-the-fact privatization should be treated like initial
privatization because privatizing is an affirmative step, regardless of when it is
done. In practice, a thorough inquiry in these cases might turn on indicia of a
TikTok user’s sophistication. If a user seems active and sophisticated, as
evidenced by regular public engagement with other users, the initial public setting
ought to be taken at face value. That reduces the weight of after-the-fact
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privatization decisions. Conversely, if a user appears unsophisticated, that lends
weight to the proposition that their initial public settings might have been
inadvertent. That, in turn, undermines the idea that they ought to satisfy the
“manifestly made public” inquiry.
In summary, TikTok can only make a compelling case that its collection of
“faceprints” and “voiceprints” is permissible under 9(2)(e) for certain kinds of
user profiles. Because it is likely not feasible for TikTok to consistently
disaggregate different types of users, 9(2)(e) is not a strong legal argument on
which to base the entire data collection regime. Although TikTok could, and likely
would, argue constructive consent, available regulatory guidance suggests that
constructive consent arguments would not succeed. Moreover, as discussed in
Section VI, such arguments should not succeed as a normative matter.
Nonetheless, even if TikTok fails to satisfy the requirements of 9(2)(e), collection
of special category biometric data may still be justified under 9(2)(a).211

4. Have TikTok users explicitly consented to processing of their data?
Whether TikTok’s collection of “faceprints” and “voiceprints” is permitted
under GDPR 9(2)(a) will depend on the robustness of data subjects’ consent. In
the digital age, privacy laws are struggling to keep pace with rapidly shifting data
collection norms. This is because “[b]asic principles of information privacy
developed in an age where technology and data simply did not exist in the way
they do now.”212 As a result, even advanced legal regimes like GDPR are largely
silent on algorithmic products and other technological innovations with major
implications for consumer privacy.213 This Section begins with a normative
discussion of consent in the age of Big Data and concludes with a discussion of
user consent to TikTok’s data collection under GDPR Article 9(2)(a).
In the U.S., conceptions of privacy rely at least partially on individuals’
“reasonable expectations.”214 Although “an individual’s subjective expectation of
privacy is fluid and case-specific,”215 subjective expectations of privacy must be
objectively reasonable to be protected.216 Different circumstances give rise to
211
212
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Matt Bartlett, Beyond Privacy: Protecting Data Interests in the Age of Artificial Intelligence, 3 LAW, TECH. &
HUM. 96, 100 (2021).
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1974, Electronic Communications Protection Act of 1986, Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act of 1996.
Id. at 107.
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different reasonable expectations of privacy.217 Although GDPR and other
international privacy regimes afford consumers more protection than U.S. privacy
laws do, European privacy doctrines also incorporate the concept of reasonable
expectations of privacy.218 The difference lies in which circumstances are
considered to give rise to those reasonable expectations.219
Things become more complicated in the digital space for three reasons. First,
there is a major information and literacy gap between data subjects and
processors.220 Additionally, the legal language used in agreements such as terms of
use and privacy policies is not readily comprehensible to most non-lawyers.221
When this fact is considered in conjunction with users’ unsophisticated
understandings of the technical parameters of the services they use, it is
unsurprising that one recent study found that “approximately 52% of users believe
that a privacy policy ensures complete confidentiality of online information.” 222
Even if some users are genuinely informed and have their eyes wide open when
interacting with digital service providers, it is not safe to assume most users are so
well informed.
Second, modern technologies can be accessed from anywhere, blurring the
lines between public and private spaces and content.223 For example, anybody with
a smartphone can access TikTok. The same is true of other apps and websites,
from Instagram to Google. Therefore, a user’s physical location is no longer
critically important in determining reasonable expectations of privacy. A user is
likely to have the same privacy expectations whether they open an app at work, at
home, or elsewhere.
Third, many apps and social media platforms force agreement to their terms
of use to create a profile.224 This requirement calls into question the voluntariness
of consent to those terms of use. Consumers are theoretically free to simply not
make profiles or use platforms. However, there are few meaningful alternatives to
some of these services. For example, while a consumer may opt out of a specific
email service provider, opting out of email altogether is unrealistic. Social media
217
218
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is more complex because it is less professionally essential than email. Nonetheless,
opting out of all social media can lead to harms such as reduced social connections
and increased difficulty developing professional networks. As things stand, opting
out is the only alternative to accepting companies’ invasive terms of service.
How, then, should GDPR regard TikTok users who “consent” to collection
of their “faceprints” and “voiceprints?” This turns on users’ ability to opt out of
data processing at least as much as it turns on their opting in by consenting to
TikTok’s privacy policy. GDPR requires that data subjects must be able to
withdraw their consent at any time. If users’ ability to withdraw their consent
includes the ability to stop collection and storage of their “faceprints” and
“voiceprints” moving forward, this will likely pass muster. Because social media
is not an essential service, regulators are unlikely to be concerned that users must
agree to TikTok’s terms of use to make a profile. If, however, withdrawing
consent does not allow users to prospectively opt out of further data collection,
users’ consent may be legally inadequate. The fact that facial images and audio
recordings are listed as data that TikTok collects automatically suggests that it may
be difficult to prospectively opt out of their collection, even if users can request
that TikTok delete images and recordings it has already collected. That, in turn,
calls into question whether they are truly able to withdraw their consent, even if
the original consent was adequate.

D. Does TikTok’s Data Collection Meet the Proportionality
Test?
Assuming regulators considered the consent obtained by TikTok adequate,
the final question is whether TikTok’s data collection would pass the
proportionality inquiries built into GDPR.225 In the European rights framework,
proportionality is a balancing tool used to reconcile competing rights or
interests.226 Proportionality, as a general tool, relies on three subtests: suitability,
which examines instrumental rationality; necessity, which examines infringement
of the “essence” of the right; and proportionality stricto sensu, which looks to overall
balancing of the costs and benefits.227
In the wake of recent regulatory guidance and Court of Justice of the
European Union (CJEU) decisions, proportionality inquiries are now firmly
embedded in GDPR interpretation.228 However, “the exact understanding of
proportionality in data protection law remains uncharted . . . [and] nobody knows
225
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exactly how to assess proportionality in the context of personal data
protection.”229 In the absence of a data protection-specific conception of
proportionality, this Section considers whether TikTok’s practices are likely to
pass a general proportionality inquiry.
Whether TikTok’s activities are proportional depends on technical
specifications. Could TikTok offer the filters and other features that are a
signature component of its platform without collecting “faceprints” and
“voiceprints?” How closely the data is tied to the services offered determines
whether the data collection passes the suitability subtest. If the data is not clearly
necessary to offer TikTok’s services, TikTok’s data collection is likely to fail the
suitability inquiry. Failing to employ the least restrictive means available could also
prevent TikTok from passing the necessity subtest. If TikTok could not provide
these features without the data collection at issue, and if TikTok can demonstrate
that it is only collecting the data necessary to fulfill these technical requirements,
its data collection practices would pass the suitability and necessity inquiries.
If a complaint turns on a proportionality stricto sensu inquiry, things may
become more difficult for TikTok. Fun social media filters do not necessarily
provide substantial societal value, regardless of how much users enjoy them. That
is fine if courts and regulators do not perceive TikTok as infringing on major
rights. However, social media filters are not a sufficiently important interest to
clearly outweigh substantial limitations on fundamental rights. In short, whether
TikTok passes this step of the proportionality test hinges on whether its data
collection practices are meaningfully infringing on rights.

VI. T IK T OK AS A C ASE S TU DY : A F RAME WORK F OR
R E GU LATION OF F AC IAL IMAGE S
While Section V is descriptive, applying recent interpretations of GDPR to
TikTok’s practices, this Section is prescriptive. Specifically, it will argue that
GDPR and ICCPR should both be updated to respond more effectively to cases
like Clearview and TikTok. These cases will only increase in number and
importance based on technological developments like mass-scale FRT-based
payment systems,230 use of FRT by major airlines,231 and the introduction of
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cameras that use FRT to automatically snap and frame shots of your loved ones
using built-in “subject recognition.”232

A. Updating Interpretations of GDPR
This Section argues that regulators should implement four changes to
GDPR interpretation: treating all facial images as special category biometric data
under GDPR Article 9, codifying consent standards, clarifying the proportionality
inquiry for data processing, and prohibiting photo scraping as a general practice.

1. Treating all facial images as special category biometric data under
GDPR Article 9
Regulators should consider all facial images, even those that have only been
processed to the degree necessary for collection, to be special category biometric
data under GDPR Article 9. This would be a more manageable standard because
the boundary between “processed” and “unprocessed” images grows increasingly
fuzzy with data collection by entities like TikTok. A bright-line rule for all entities
collecting and retaining facial images would better keep pace with technological
developments. Limiting this to entities that retain facial images would avoid overinclusion of entities such as traffic camera operators.
Treating all facial images as biometric data would also accord with the plain
meaning of “uniquely identifying a natural person.”233 Because facial images are
representations of unique individuals, looking at a picture allows you to identify
the person depicted. Attaching a sufficient number of non-hash value labels might
also allow a user to “triangulate” a person, making them functionally identifiable
with a sufficiently narrow search. In short, a “person’s image constitutes one of
the chief attributes of his or her personality, as it reveals the person’s unique
characteristics and distinguishes the person from his or her peers.”234 The link to
identification of a natural person is intuitive.
Processing for identification of a natural person is the standard for inclusion
under GDPR Article 9. Data processors and controllers with non-pretextual
business reasons for retaining facial images should have the burden of proof to
demonstrate that their practices do not implicate identifiability concerns through
manually viewing images or “triangulation”-style identification. Some data
processors and controllers might argue that the facial images they collect should
not be considered special category biometric data because photos are not
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inherently biometric data.235 However, cases where this argument is strong are
likely an extremely small portion of processors, assuming they exist. Therefore, it
would be better to treat all facial images as special category biometric data.
Regulators could allow an appeal process for processors to argue that their data
does not raise identifiability concerns. However, such an appeals scheme is likely
to raise manageability issues for regulators.
Certain private entities would not be affected by these new limitations. Due
to the so-called household exemption, GDPR does not apply to processing of
personal data “by a natural person in the course of a purely personal or household
activity.”236 This provision is construed extremely narrowly. Home security
cameras and other privately operated video surveillance technology are not
exempt if their coverage area includes any public spaces.237 However, any
commercial entity running video surveillance on its premises would need to pass
the inquiries discussed in Section V. Therefore, small stores might find it
advantageous to hire external security companies to collect and store surveillance
footage. Larger commercial entities whose primary activity is video surveillance
should be well equipped to manage GDPR regulatory burdens.
Although this framework would limit most private entities’ ability to collect
and process facial images, it would not prevent government entities like police
from doing so. This is because GDPR Articles 6 and 9 contain explicit carve-outs
for government activities. Article 6 creates a legal basis for processing data where
“processing is necessary for the performance of a task carried out in the public
interest or in the exercise of official authority vested in the controller.”238 Although
the “public interest” basis requires the processing to be done according to either
E.U. law or member state law,239 each member state is fully entitled to pass laws
authorizing its police force to store and analyze facial images. Article 10, which
requires processing of personal data related to criminal convictions, offenses, or
related security measures to be carried out by official authorities, further supports
this.240 Therefore, police processing of facial images to address criminal activity
fulfills the required legal bases for data processing.
Processing by police for purposes of crime prevention, investigation, and
prosecution further fulfills the requirements for processing special category data.
Article 9 permits processing of biometric data where “processing is necessary for

239

See Stupp, supra note 85 (citing a commentator as saying “a person’s photo isn’t automatically
considered biometric”).
GDPR, supra note 51, art. 2(2)(c).
See Guidelines 3/2019 on Processing of Personal Data through Video Devices, EUR. DATA PROT. BD.
(adopted Jul. 10, 2019) 6, https://perma.cc/N4FF-HQFJ.
GDPR art. 6(1)(e).
Id. art. 6(3).

240

See id. art. 10.

235

236
237

238

230

Vol. 23 No. 1

Facial Images in International Law

Kohn

reasons of substantial public interest.”241 Processing under the Article 9 “public
interest” permission must provide safeguards and be both proportional and
lawful.242 However, a narrowly circumscribed use carried out with strong
safeguards by police seems likely, on face, to pass a proportionality inquiry.
A shift to treating all facial images as special category biometric data
governed by GDPR Article 9 may be challenging to administer. However,
companies doing business in the E.U. already must demonstrate GDPR
compliance. Therefore, providing additional explanation of Article 9 permission
for their activities does not create a substantial new regulatory compliance burden.
It simply requires them to include additional information in disclosures.
Retroactivity is a bigger potential problem than administrability. However,
this proposal could be phased in, with penalties only applying to conduct carried
out after the new rules are in force. That would give data processors and
controllers an opportunity to adjust their business practices in the E.U. member
states are well within their rights to change laws to protect consumers and address
other compelling societal interests.

2. Codifying consent standards
Regulators should codify standards for consent obtained by private actors.
When evaluating the adequacy of consent, entities like TikTok raise a different set
of concerns than public entities like school boards. Clarifying these standards is
increasingly important with the rise of “data harvesters” whose business models
are based on monetizing data.243 Because consumers may not be fully aware of the
economic value of the data they are signing away and it is not in data harvesters’
interest to make them aware of that value, regulators should promulgate robust,
ongoing consent requirements. Clarifying consent standards would enhance both
enforcement and voluntary compliance efforts. It may also raise public awareness
of the issue, which would allow data subjects to make more informed decisions.

3. Clarifying the proportionality inquiry
Regulators should promulgate guidance on applying the least restrictive
means subtest of the proportionality test to entities such as TikTok, whose choice
of methods for processing data is constrained by technical requirements.244 This
would allow private data processors and controllers to proactively comply with
GDPR, rather than reacting when their policies are found to be impermissible. It
would also facilitate uniform application of the proportionality test by regulators.
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Without clear guidance, there is a serious risk that different regulators will develop
and apply different versions of the least restrictive means subtest.245

4. Prohibiting photo scraping
Regulators should prohibit photo scraping as a general practice, rather than
relying on individual data subjects to bring regulatory complaints requesting that
companies delete their scraped data. Although it is nominally public, the
information scraped by Clearview and similar companies generates privacy
interests that should be protected.246 Collecting and processing facial images in
this way entails: 1) a loss of anonymity, even if such loss is incremental; 2)
infringement on both control247 and economic248 interests; 3) loss of “protection
of personality;”249 and 4) damage to the “fundamental human values of dignity
and autonomy.”250 Exploiting this kind of data also harms a social interest.
“[T]hinking about data rights solely from the individual’s perspective, as through
the lens of privacy, fundamentally misunderstands how data is now used in the
data economy.”251 Illustratively, “data harvesters” use algorithms to gather data on
individuals who have not provided them with any data, based on predictions
generated from information provided by their friends and family.252 Similarly, the
racial disparities in false positives in FRT speak to broader societal interests
stemming from processing of individuals’ data.253 In these ways, and a myriad of
others, what happens to an individual’s data has broad ripple effects, creating a
societal interest in regulation.
Photo scraping also creates incentive problems for individuals whose photos
might be scraped by services like Clearview. To reduce the risk of photos being
caught in Clearview’s scraping, individuals might wish to minimize the number of
their photos available on the internet. That, in turn, could result in damage to
networks with weak ties. For example, if individuals choose to not allow their
employers to publish headshots, that makes identification of unknown individuals
in the office more difficult. Similarly, a heightened risk of identification relative to
245
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manual identification of photos reduces individuals’ incentives to engage in
controversial activities like attending political protests or unionizing.254 A defined
privacy interest in facial images protects these kinds of networks and behaviors.
If they are concerned about foreclosing public benefits, rather than banning
all photo scraping, legislators could draft legislation to cover photo scraping that
is structured similarly to GDPR Article 9. As discussed in Section II.B.1,
beginning with a prohibition on processing and carving out narrow exceptions
leads to tighter regulation of data processing than alternative frameworks. A law
like GDPR Article 9 could allow photo scraping for purposes like academic
research while prohibiting monetization of unsuspecting individuals’ online
activities.

B. Updating ICCPR
Because ICCPR has 173 parties,255 it has the potential for a far broader
impact than GDPR. However, this must be balanced against the fact that ICCPR
cannot, by its nature, be nearly as specific as GDPR. On balance, several critical
updates would markedly increase its utility, even though they would not be as
specific as GDPR or national legislation. Given the difficulty of building
consensus among 173 States Parties, having the U.N. Human Rights Committee
release new interpretive comments is likely to be a more productive path forward
than updating the text of ICCPR itself. The Human Rights Committee would be
particularly well served by releasing three new comments.
First, it should interpret ICCPR Article 17 as requiring robust consent for
digital data collection generally and facial image collection specifically. Specific
interpretive language about consent and other high-level principles would be
useful for countries looking to enhance their privacy regimes.
Second, it should release a comment codifying heightened protection for
minors’ data in the specific context of facial images. As GDPR and other privacy
regimes recognize, minors are a more vulnerable population than adults. They also
have a reduced capacity for consent, which heightens their vulnerability.
Third, it should release a comment codifying the expectation of “privacy in
public.”256 Shifting the burden to companies to demonstrate waiver of a
presumption of privacy, rather than putting the burden on consumers to show
254

255

256

See Amory Starr, Luis A. Fernandez, Randall Amster, Lesley J. Wood & Manuel J. Caro, The Impacts
of State Surveillance on Political Assembly and Association: A Socio-Legal Analysis, 31 QUAL. SOCIO. 251,
258 (2008) (“Recent publicity of massive surveillance databases, along with codes and tags such as
“criminal extremist” and “domestic terrorist,” have created widespread fear to participate in
completely legal political events.”).
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, U.N. TREATY COLLECTION,
https://perma.cc/4GAT-VG4C.
Xiao, supra note 246, at 702.

Summer 2022

233

Chicago Journal of International Law

that they have created a special privacy interest, would substantially increase the
efficacy of a privacy regime based on ICCPR.

VII. C ONC LU SION : L OOKING B EY OND THE E.U.
Updating GDPR and providing additional interpretive guidance of ICCPR
would be tremendously beneficial for protecting ordinary individuals’ privacy
rights. The status quo is, at best, one of uneven digital privacy rights. Current
models of consent are undermined by a widening expertise gap that “is eroding
the very idea of autonomy as a pillar of the data protection framework.” 257 The
problem is compounded by rapid technological developments, which are swiftly
outpacing regulations designed to constrain them. Individual consumers lack
power to address the situation. Therefore, having comprehensive regulatory
schemes that adequately address these challenges is critical.
Regulations like GDPR and ICCPR will only become more important
considering technological developments like those discussed in Section VI. Given
the importance of both individual privacy interests and the broader societal
concerns affected by the rise of FRT and facial image collection, the time to
update GDPR and ICCPR is now, while there is still time for regulations to shape
technological developments. Delaying necessary updates increases the odds that
technological innovations will constrain regulatory developments, rather than the
inverse.
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